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International pressure to revalue China’s currency stems in part from the expectation that 
rapid  economic  growth  should  be  associated  with  an  underlying  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation.    This  hinges  on  the  Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis,  which  sees  growth  as 
stemming from improvements in traded sector productivity and associated rises in wages and 
non-traded  prices.    Yet,  despite  extraordinary  growth  after  the  mid-1990s  China’s  real 
exchange rate showed no tendency to appreciate until after 2004.  We use a dynamic general 
equilibrium model to simulate the economy and show that, during this period, trade reforms 
and a rising national saving rate were offsetting forces in the presence of elastic labour supply.  
We  then  examine  the  possible  determinants  of  the  striking  transition  to  real  appreciation 
thereafter,  noting  mounting  evidence  that  an  improved  rural  terms  of  trade  has  tightened 
China’s labour market.  We show that, should the Chinese government bow to international 
pressure by appreciating the renminbi either via an extraordinary monetary contraction or via 


















   1 
Appreciating the Renminbi 
 
1. Introduction 
China’s arguably low Renminbi (RMB) has been at the centre of political debates over 
current  account  imbalances  for  more  than  a  decade.    In  scholarly  circles,  while  a  few, 
including  McKinnon  (2006),  argue  that  a  RMB  appreciation  would  not  address  the 
imbalances of concern to the US, numerous studies have supported the view that the currency 
is undervalued, by margins ranging from ‘small’ to as high as 50%,
1 and some conclude that a 
unilateral appreciation of the RMB is essential.
2  Expectations that China’s exchange rate 
should  be  appreciating  are  based  commonly  on  the  Balassa  (1964)  –  Samuelson  (1964) 
hypothesis (BSH).  This implies a positive relationship between economic growth and the 
underlying  real  exchange  rate,  driven  by  productivity  catch-up  in  developing  countries’ 
tradable sectors and, in association, rising wages and prices in their non-traded sectors. 
Empirical evidence from studies by Lu (2006), Fogel (2006) and Tyers et al. (2008) 
suggests that China’s tradable productivity growth has been double that of the US since the 
early 1990s (Gordon 2003, 2006).  The productivity pattern therefore appears to support a real 
appreciation relative to the US consistent with the BSH.  More controversial, however, is the 
expectation that the productivity gains force relative growth in real wages.  That this is true to 
some degree is clear from the official statistics (Garnaut and Huang 2007).  Yet the real wages 
of non-hukou workers are less formally recorded and Meng and Bai (2007), among others, 
suggest that these grew more slowly, if at all, at least until the mid-2000s.  The BSH then 
posits that faster Chinese growth in both tradable productivity and real wages should cause a 
rise in relative non-traded services prices, which is also observed through the mid-2000s (Lu 
2006, Tyers et al. 2008).  In spite of all this evidence supporting the BSH, there was no 
significant real appreciation between the mid-1990s and 2004. 
The resolution of this puzzle requires a number of generalisations of the BSH; most 
significant amongst which is the relaxation of the assumption that the law of one price applies 
for all traded goods.  This greatly broadens the set of determinants of the real exchange rate.  
The net effect of China’s rapid economic growth on its real exchange rate is then seen to 
depend on the sources of that growth and the consequent pattern of endowment changes and 
sectoral distributions of productivity growth and tradability.  Of considerable importance in 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Frankel (2004), Wang (2004), Goldstein (2004), Coudert and Couharde (2005), Tyers et al. 
(2008) and Cheung et al (2007a, 2007b). 
2 See, for example, Cline, W. (2005).   2 
the  decade  to  the  mid-2000s  is  the  short  run  impact  of  China’s  widening  current 
account surplus, which stems from its extraordinarily high total saving rate, and the WTO 
accession trade reforms. 
We show that a strong reversal of the earlier tendency for the real exchange rate to 
depreciate against the BSH occurred after 2004, raising China’s production costs by a third, 
relative to the US.  We explore this change and discuss its determinants, noting mounting 
evidence not for a return to the dominance of the BSH but instead for a tightening labour 
market  associated,  at  least  in  part,  with  an  improved  rural  terms  of  trade.    Turning  to 
macroeconomic policy, we then examine the controversy over China’s extensive holdings of 
official foreign reserves, finding these to be a consequence of its capital controls and its high 
saving  rate.    By  international  standards,  however,  we  show  that  they  do  not  appear  to 
represent extraordinary holdings of generic foreign assets.  We then examine the exchange 
rate target as monetary policy, concluding that, should the Chinese government respond to 
international pressure with a premature nominal revaluation or some form of export restraint, 
the consequences would be harmful to both Chinese and global interests. 
The next section offers a brief formalisation of the BSH and presents the Chinese 
evidence.  A generalisation is then presented in Section 3, enabling the decomposition of 
China’s real exchange rate path to the mid-2000s and showing the importance of the saving 
rate and trade reforms in this period.  The section then goes on to review evidence as to the 
reasons for the more recent appreciating trend.  The role of China’s macroeconomic policy is 
discussed in Section 4.  In section 5, two scenarios for short term unilateral appreciation of the 
RMB are offered.  General conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. China’s real exchange rate puzzle 
If the nominal exchange rate, E, is defined as the number of units of foreign exchange 
obtained  for  a  unit  of  the  domestic  currency,  the  real  exchange  rate, 
R e ,  can  be  defined 
correspondingly as the rate of exchange between the home product bundle and corresponding 
bundles produced abroad.  It follows that the bilateral real exchange rate for a focus (home) 
country with foreign trading partner i can be approximated as the common currency ratio of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) prices (deflators) of the two countries,  ( ) ,
Y N T P p p  and   3 
( ) , /
Y N T
i i i i P p p E , where 
T p and 
N p  are indices over all the focus country’s non-traded and 
traded goods and services, respectively.3 
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This is the identity linking the real and nominal exchange rates.  Consider the case in 
which prices at home and abroad are measured in a common currency, the share of non-traded 
products in GDP, θ, is the same at home and abroad, prices are aggregated appropriately using 
a Cobb-Douglas index and the law of one price applies to all traded goods.  The latter implies 
that  trade  is  costless  and  undistorted,  so  that 
T T
i p p = .  Under  these  conditions,  the  real 
exchange rate becomes 
  ( ) ( )
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From this, the key role of non-traded goods prices is clear.  When prices are measured in a 
common currency, or relative to a common numeraire, it is the ratio of the home and foreign 
non-traded goods prices that matters in determining the real exchange rate. 
To illustrate the associated dependence on productivity, imagine that labour is the single fixed 
factor and that the rates of output per worker in the home traded and non-traded sectors are 
T A  and 
N A .  In trading partner i, the corresponding rates are
T
i A  and 
N
i A .  The relationships 
between the wage rate and product prices in the traded and non-traded sectors follow from 
equating the wage in both sectors with the values of the marginal products of labour in each: 
,
T T N N T T N N
i i i i i W A P A P W A P A P = = = = , from which it follows that the divergence in wage 
rates between trading partners depends only on their tradable productivities: 
T T
i i W W A A = . 
If the non-traded productivity level is the same in all trading partners (
N N
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Under the assumptions of the BSH, then, an economy that is growing faster than its 
trading  partners  also  has  1)  faster  tradable  productivity  growth, ˆ ˆ T T
i A A > ,  2)  faster  wage 
                                                 
3 Here we imagine that, rather than the continuum of tradability that is observed across goods and services, 
traded and non-traded goods are separated starkly as T, N.   4 
growth  ˆ ˆ
i W W > ,  3)  relative  service  price  inflation  ˆ ˆ
N N
i p p > ,  and  4)  an  appreciating  real 
exchange rate ( ˆ 0 R e > ).  The hypothesis then implies that, if developing countries are poorer 
because their tradable labour productivity is lower, then their comparatively rapid growth 
should be associated with real appreciations against their richer trading partners.  Support for 
the hypothesis requires that all four of its predictions be observed. 
While wider empirical evidence in support of the BSH is mixed, when price levels are 
compared through time and across large numbers of countries the pattern of real appreciation 
amongst the more rapidly growing countries is observed.
4  For the case of China, we observe 
convincing  evidence  of  faster  tradable  productivity  growth  (Table  1)  and  higher  price 
inflation in the service sector (“tertiary” industry and construction) through the mid-2000s 
(Figure 1).  Yet, as Figure 2 shows, no real appreciation was observed until after 2003.  For a 
reflection of this on monthly data we use Chinese and US producer price indices in Figure 3, 
which shows the same real depreciating trend through the mid-2000s with a subsequent sharp 
real appreciation in the lead-up to the GFC.  Clearly, to understand the path of China’s real 
exchange  rate  we  require  a  generalization  of  the  BSH,  and  this  means  relaxing  key 
assumptions. 
 
3. Determinants of the path of China’s real exchange rate 
An  understanding  of  the  path  of  China’s  real  exchange  rate  first  requires  a 
generalization of the BSH assumptions.  We review these briefly and go on to quantify the 
determinants more generally using a numerical model of the global economy.  Then we use 
that model to decompose the forces affecting it in the period 1997 to 2006. 
 
                                                 
4 Cheung et al. (2007b) and Bergin et al. (2006) show the trend across countries and through time well.  Other 
studies with more mixed results include those by Engel (1999), Choudhri and Khan (2004) and Miyajima (2005).   5 
 
Generalising the BSH assumptions 
Tradable productivity gap: BSH assumes that non-tradable sector productivities are the same 
across countries, thus only the tradable productivity gap matters.  This assumption is often 
violated in reality, especially for developed/developing country pairs.  Whatever the relative 
performance  of  China’s  services  sector  in  the  past,  recent  evidence  suggests  substantial 
potential for catch-up and accelerated productivity growth in the future (Ma, 2006). 
The law of one price for tradable goods: Failures of the law of one price have been observed 
for tradable goods in specific instances.
5  Goods and services are not homogeneous across 
countries but are differentiated at minimum by country of origin.
6  Supply and/or demand side 
factors that raise the volume of tradable production move the home country down the global 
demand  curves  for  its  product  varieties,  reducing  its  supply  prices  and  resulting  in 
deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  a  depreciation  of  its  real  exchange  rate.    Factor 
endowment  growth  and  changes  in  policy  that  lead  to  substitution  in  demand  for  home 
products therefore depreciate real exchange rates. 
Labour  arbitrage:  In  most  developing  economies,  there  is  a  Harris-Todaro  gulf  between 
wages in the modern and rural sectors.  If labour mobility between the rural and industrial 
sectors is inferior to that between the rural and service sectors (particularly the construction 
sector), then industrial productivity growth does not necessarily drive up service wages or 
service costs, at least not to the same extent on average.
7 
Closed  capital  account:
8 The  assumption  that  the  real  exchange  rate  depends  only  on 
interactions among countries associated with trade in merchandise is clearly violated in many 
of  today’s  developing  countries,  and  particularly  in  China.    Its  violation,  in  concert  with 
failures of the law of one price for traded goods, means that any influx of payments (in the 
form of a foreign direct investment, portfolio capital flow or a repatriation of official foreign 
reserves) raises home aggregate demand.  Since traded goods are supplied more elastically via 
imports than are non-traded goods — which depend on home resources—such an influx must 
raise relative non-traded prices and therefore appreciate the real exchange rate.  Conversely, 
effluxes like China’s extraordinary foreign reserve accumulations cause depreciation. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Bergin et al. (2006); Crucini et al. (2005); and Drine and Rault (2005). 
6 This is a standard assumption in the most widely used numerical models of open economies and global trade. 
See, for example, Dixon et al. (1982); McKibbin and Sachs (1991); Hertel (1997); and Dixon and Rimmer 
(2002). 
7 Evidence for this is offered by Chang and Tyers (2008). 
8 Here we adopt a working definition of the capital account as broadly including all flows on the balance of 
payments associated with asset acquisition.  As such, it encompasses the more narrowly defined capital account, 
the financial account and official reserve transactions.   6 
Allowing for failures of the law of one price for tradable goods, there are numerous 
other forces tending to depreciate the real exchange rate in the long term.  During the past two 
decades one such force has been China’s ‘demographic dividend’, stemming from the high 
proportion of working-aged people in the total population.  This, according to Cai and Wang 
(2005), accounted for about one-quarter of per capita GDP growth between 1980 and 2003.
9  
It has played a critical role in keeping wages and hence the real exchange rate low, thereby 
enabling the rapid expansion of labour-intensive manufactured exports.  Eventually, however, 
the “one child policy” will age the population, having the opposite effect, placing upward 
pressure on real wages and the real exchange rate.
10 
Another potential driver of China’s real exchange rate is education and training.  Fogel 
(2006) shows that increasing secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios have a sizeable impact 
on the per capita GDP growth rate.
11  To the extent that services are skill intensive (as they 
are according to past data), this will boost performance in the service sector—again, tending 
to depreciate China’s real exchange rate. 
 
Modelling the impacts of growth shocks on the real exchange rate 
Here  we  examine  quantitatively  the  relationship  between  shocks  associated  with 
China’s economic growth and its real exchange rate.  To do this effectively, a numerical 
model is required that is global in scope and that incorporates the generalisations of the BSH 
discussed above.  Recall that these included productivity growth in non-tradable as well as 
tradable sectors, departures from the law of one price for tradable goods, a more sophisticated 
representation of the labour market and an open capital account.  With these generalisations, 
almost all shocks to the economy have implications for the real exchange rate. 
Drawing on Tyers and Golley (2008) and Tyers et al. (2008), we use a multi-region, 
multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world economy that subdivides the world into 
14  regions,  with  China  defined  to  include  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong.
12   Industries  are 
aggregated into three sectors: food (agriculture, including processed foods), industry (mining 
                                                 
9 See Bloom and Williamson 1998 for a generic discussion of the demographic dividend in developing countries. 
10 Golley and Tyers 2006 confirm this, finding that the non-working aged dependency ratio could rise to 43 per 
cent. 
11 For example, he calculates that if the tertiary enrolment ratio rose from six to 25 in the next 20 years (putting 
China where the Western European nations were in 1980), the growth rate of labour productivity would rise by 
4.4 per cent between 2000 and 2020, and that this would account for more than 60 per cent of the per capita GDP 
growth target set in 2002.  With the tertiary ratio increasing from 12.5 per cent to 19 per cent between 2000 and 
2004, if anything, his estimates could be too conservative. 
12 The regions are Australia, North America (Canada, US, Mexico), Western Europe, Central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, Japan, China, Indonesia, Other East and Southeast Asia, India, Other South Asia, Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East and the rest of the world.   7 
and  manufacturing)  and  services  (including  construction)—the  latter  being  little  traded  in 
comparison with the other two.  Failures of the law of one price are represented by product 
differentiation,  so  that  consumers  substitute  imperfectly  between  products  from  different 
regions.    As  in  other  dynamic  models  of  the  global  economy,  the  primary  endogenous 
component of simulated economic growth is physical capital accumulation.  Technical change 
is introduced in the form of exogenous productivity growth that is sector and factor specific, 
allowing  the  analysis  of  productivity  performance  that  differs  between  tradable  and  non-
tradable sectors. 
Regional capital accounts are open and investors have adaptive expectations about real 
regional net rates of return on installed capital.  In each region, the level of investment is 
determined by a comparison of expected net rates of return on domestic installed capital with 
borrowing rates yielded by a global trust, to which each region’s saving contributes, adjusted 
by  calibrated  region-specific  interest  premiums.    Lagged  adjustment  processes  ensure, 
however, that financial capital is not fully mobile internationally in the short term, but that the 
paths of domestic and  global interest rates become parallel, separated only by exogenous 
premiums in the long term.  In representing China, general financial reform is represented by 
a  diminution  of  the  interest  premium  and  this  causes  an  unambiguous  rise  in  Chinese 
investment and hence a decrease in its current account surplus and an acceleration in its rate 
of physical capital accumulation. 
To augment the model’s characterisation of changes in labour supply and quality, it 
encompasses  both  demographic  and  economic  change.    It  tracks  populations  in  four  age 
groups, two genders and two skill categories: a total of 16 population groups in each defined 
region.    The  skill  subdivision  is  between  production  labour  (unskilled)  and  professional 
labour  (skilled).
13   Each  age–gender–skill  group  is  represented  as  a  homogeneous  sub-
population with a group-specific birth and death rate, labour force participation rate, saving 
rate and rates of immigration and emigration.  Because the non-traded sector is relatively 
intensive in skill, trends in skill composition prove to be particularly important.  These depend 
on the rate at which each region’s education and social development institutions transform 
unskilled (production-worker) families into skilled (professional-worker) families.  Each year 
a  particular  proportion  of  the  population  in  each  production-worker  age–gender  group  is 
transferred  to  professional  status.    The  initial  values  of  these  proportions  depend  on  the 
                                                 
13 The  subdivision  between  production  workers  and  professionals  and  para-professionals  accords  with  the 
International Labour Organisation’s occupation-based classification and is consistent with the labour division 
adopted in the GTAP Database. See Liu et al. (1998).   8 
regions’ levels of development, the associated capacities of their education systems and the 
relative sizes of their production and professional labour forces.   Rates of transformation 
change through time in response to corresponding changes in real per capita income and the 
skilled wage premium.
14 
We focus on shocks associated with China’s growth.  The most significant of these are 
productivity  increases,  skill  transformation  rate  increases,  interest  premium  decreases 
(increases in net financial inflows) and tariff decreases (increases in openness).  In each case, 
we run a new simulation in which the determinant in question is shocked once and for all, as 
of 2005.  We then extract the elasticity of China’s real exchange rate to each shock, tracking 
the values through time to 2030.  We focus on the bilateral real exchange rate, measured as in 
Equation  (1),  between  China  (including  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong)  and  ‘North  America’ 
(including  Canada  and  Mexico),  since  this  best  parallels  China’s  nominal  exchange  rate 
policy and the renminbi valuation debate.  The results are summarised in Figure 4.  Consider 
each determinant in turn. 
Sectoral total factor productivity: The elasticities shown represent the percentage departure of 
the  projected  real  exchange  rate  for  each  percentage  per  annum  increase  in  total  factor 
productivity.    The  appreciating  effects  of  tradable  (industrial)  productivity  increases  are 
consistent with the BSH and are, as expected, due to wage growth and relative service price 
inflation.  They are bolstered in the short term by increased investment and hence greater net 
inflows on the capital account.  In the long term, however, the enlargement of the industrial 
capital stock reduces costs and hence offsets the real exchange rate gains.  Also, as expected 
from the dominance of non-traded sector prices in Equation (2), faster service productivity 
growth depreciates the real exchange rate—modestly in the early years but to a dominant 
extent in the long term, when it is reinforced by associated capital accumulation. 
Skilling of the labour force: When the skill acquisition rate is increased in China, where the 
unskilled  (or  production)  worker  population  is  larger  than  its  skilled  (or  professional) 
counterpart, the proportional boost to skilled workers is larger than the proportional loss of 
unskilled  workers.    The  result  is  greater  output  and,  other  things  being  equal,  a  real 
depreciation.  This tendency is enhanced by the fact that the services sector is comparatively 
skill intensive, so that the shock causes a relatively large boost to service output and hence a 
relatively large fall in the home service price (relative to North America).  The result is a 
                                                 
14 China’s skill share is projected to rise through time while that in its real exchange rate comparator, North 
America, remains static.  The contrast is due to North  America’s  higher initial  skill share, its  high rate of 
unskilled immigration and its higher fertility rate (Tyers and Bain 2006).   9 
relatively large real depreciation in the long run.  The elasticities in this case are percentage 
departures of the real exchange rate for each per cent of the production-worker (unskilled) 
population  that  is  transformed  each  year.    Defined  this  way,  skill  transformation  places 
downward  pressure  on  the  real  exchange  rate  of  a  magnitude  similar  to  total  factor 
productivity in services. 
Financial  influx:  This  is  induced  by  a  decline  in  China’s  interest  premium.    It  raises 
investment and therefore increases aggregate demand and the real exchange rate.  A positive 
demand-driven effect is therefore expected in the first instance.  In the long term, however, 
when the effect of the investment on the capital stock is realised, the supply side dominates.  
More  abundant  and  hence  cheaper  capital  reduces  production  costs,  yielding  a  real 
depreciation.  The elasticity to investment premium decline (financial capital inflow) is large 
and positive in the short term, with the lag to the switch in sign measuring at least 15 years.
15 
Trade liberalisation: This switches demand away from home-produced goods and services 
towards imported varieties.  For a single region, the supply of goods and services from the 
much larger foreign market is more elastic than that of home varieties, constrained as they are 
by local factor supplies and technology.  The effect of the demand switch, then, is to reduce 
the relative prices of the home varieties and hence to depreciate the real exchange rate.  The 
elasticity is constructed by dividing the percentage change in the real exchange rate by the 
percentage point change in the import penetration ratio (the ratio of the value of imports to the 
total value of domestic consumption).  The shock on which it is based is a marginal reduction 
in all China’s merchandise trade barriers.
16  The elasticity, also shown in Figure 4, has the 
expected negative sign, and its magnitude grows through time.  The growth in the magnitude 
of the elasticity through time is due to increased investment and hence capital growth.  This 
occurs because the industrial sector, while it suffers from reduced protection, also benefits 
from lower tariffs on imported intermediate inputs.
17 
 
Decomposing the real exchange rate changes of 1997-2004 
While it is clear that the BSH appreciating force has been in action in China, our 
generalisations allow consideration of countervailing forces and it is these that must have 
                                                 
15 A corresponding shock to group saving rates was also introduced with similar results except that increased 
saving raises financial outflow, other things equal, and therefore depreciates the real exchange rate in the short 
run. 
16 The  elasticity  is  insensitive  to  the  scale  of  the  liberalisation  though  not  to  the  composition  of  China’s 
protection.  For the levels of protection embodied in the database for 1997, see Dimaranan and McDougall 
(2002). 
17 This effect is discussed in detail in Rees and Tyers (2008).   10 
prevented any significant real appreciation between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s.  Strong 
depreciating forces that might have caused this include skill acquisition, which helps control 
wage costs in the skill-intensive services sector and therefore non-traded output prices, trade 
reforms and financial flows on the balance of payments. 
The elasticities presented in Figure 4 confirm that financial flows dominate in the 
short to medium run.  The significance of this for China is clear from Figure 5, which shows 
that the saving-investment gap (the current account surplus) expanded substantially after the 
Asian financial crisis.  This expansion in net outflows diverted domestic demand abroad and 
so  placed  downward  pressure  on  China’s  real  exchange  rate.    To  see  this,  note  that  the 
equality  of  net  inflows  of  payments  on  the  capital  account  (net  outflows  on  the  current 
account)
18 to the investment–saving gap follows from the standard aggregate expenditure and 
disposal  identities.
19   Defining  net  inflows  as  positive,  the  capital  account  surplus  can  be 
written as:  NF D KA S R I S = -D = - where I is investment, SD is total domestic saving, SNF (net 
foreign saving) is net private inflow on the financial account and  R D  is the annual addition to 
official foreign reserves.  In the presence of capital controls, SNF is roughly equal to officially 
approved  inward  FDI.
20   Both  sides  of  the  equation  are  negative  in  the  case  of  China, 
indicating net outflows.  Extraordinarily, even though investment accounts for 45 per cent of 
China’s GDP, more than half of its GDP is saved.  While these outflows have surely been a 
depreciating force, the other two candidates may also have been important.  The recent surge 
in overall income growth and urbanisation has seen an acceleration of skill acquisition and a 
boost to the service economy.  At the same time, the lead-up to China’s WTO accession saw a 
substantial reduction in trade distortions. 
To separate the effects of each of these forces on the real exchange rate we begin with 
the baseline model simulation over the period 1997-2006.  This simulation incorporates all 
measured changes in sectoral productivity, skill acquisition and trade liberalisation.
21  Finally, 
the trade reform shocks associated with the WTO accession are from Rees and Tyers (2008: 
Table 3).  Note, first, that, at eight per cent, the real depreciation over this period is larger than 
observed  in  Figure  2  because  of  the  country  aggregations.    Hong  Kong  and  Taiwan 
                                                 
18 For our working definition of the “capital account”, KA, see note 10. 
19 The right hand side of this identity stems from the combination of aggregate expenditure on GDP, Y = C + I + 
G + X + M; the fact that GNP is YN = Y + N, where N is net factor income from abroad; the GNP disposal 
identity, YN = C + T + S, and the balance of payments, BoP = 0 = KA + CA, where the current account is CA = 
X – M + N. 
20 China’s capital controls have been leaky but, as Ma and McCauley (2007) find, remain very effective. 
21 The  skill  acquisition  rates  are  calibrated  using  the  model  from  wage  and  sectoral  employment  data,  as 
described in Tyers and Bain (2006).   11 
experienced larger real depreciations against the US in this period and Canada and Mexico 
both experienced real appreciations against the US.  By the simulating each shock separately, 
the model is used to construct the decomposition summarised in Table 2. 
Higher  Chinese  productivity  growth  is  seen  to  have  offered  the  expected  BSH 
appreciating force.  Net financial outflows on China’s balance of payments and inflows on the 
North American balance of payments both tend to depreciate the Chinese real exchange rate.  
Similarly,  skill  acquisition  (which  reduces  the  cost  of  supplying  mainly  skill-intensive 
services) and trade reform offer the expected depreciating forces.  In combination, the current 
account imbalances in both China and North America contribute a real depreciation of more 
than  five  per  cent.    Surprisingly  significant,  however,  is  the  depreciating  effect  of  WTO 
accession  trade  reforms,  which  contribute  more  than  four  per  cent  to  the  overall  real 
depreciation.  In the end, the current account imbalances prove to be, in combination, the 
most important depreciating forces to the mid-2000s. 
 
The real appreciation since 2004 
The exchange rate reforms launched by the Chinese authorities in July 2005 were 
intended to at least demonstrate a departure from the de facto fixed US dollar peg, nominally 
allowing  the  currency  to  fluctuate  by  up  to  0.3  per  cent  each  day.    The  appreciation 
accelerated in 2007 and the net nominal appreciation amounted to around 20 per cent by July 
2008, after which the global financial crisis induced the Chinese government to return to the 
de facto US dollar peg.  This round of revaluation was accompanied by significant domestic 
inflation, implying a substantially larger appreciation of the underlying real exchange rate 
after 2004 (Figure 2), amounting to at least 30 per cent.  As is evident from Figure 3, the 
difference between the bilateral nominal and real appreciations was associated with faster 
growth of China’s producer prices than those of the United States. 
This  change  in  the  path  of  the  real  exchange  rate  is  too  recent  for  a  detailed 
decomposition.    Sufficient  evidence  does  exist,  however,  to  enable  us  to  discuss  some 
alternative hypotheses.  In what follows we discuss a number of alternative explanations, 
eventually settling on one in particular. 
Decreasing current account surplus: After a rapid increase in early 1990s, household saving 
rates fluctuated between 20 and 25 per cent during 1997-2006 (Tyers and Lu, 2009).  The 
initial surge in household saving had been associated with the 1990s round of privatisation 
and restructuring, which increased household funding responsibilities for health, education 
and retirement expenses.  In more recent years the government has embarked on national   12 
schemes  for  health  and  retirement  insurance,  including  the  extension  of  medical  pension 
insurance to cover rural areas and the establishment of urban subsistence security systems.
22  
These have lessened this concern, leading at least to the stabilisation of household saving 
rates.  At the same time, a surge in government spending commenced with the onset of the 
global financial crisis after 2007.  This reduced the government’s contribution to national 
saving.  As shown in the Figure 5, the Chinese current account surplus has stabilised since 
2005 and recently contracted.  The prior period of real depreciation had been associated with 
the expansion of this surplus and hence the diversion of increasing shares of Chinese income 
into  expenditures  abroad.    The  cessation  of  this  trend  would  at  least  stem  further  real 
depreciation. 
Increasing oligopoly rents: Lu et al. (2008) point out that Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs)  still  dominate  industries  such  as  metals,  motor  vehicles,  aircraft,  transport, 
telecommunication, finance and insurance and that they became extremely profitable during 
the 2000s.  Tyers and Lu (2009) attribute these profits to oligopolistic behaviour and see the 
associated rents as having expanded with the post-accession growth surge, financing the huge 
corporate savings of the period.  The effect of these rents on China’s real exchange rate has 
two channels.  First, higher mark-ups in largely non-traded industries raise prices and hence 
cause appreciation.  Second, the rents gained by SOEs comprise a primary part of corporate 
saving, which has tended to divert Chinese expenditure abroad and thus depreciate the real 
exchange rate.  As Tyers and Lu show, the latter effect was dominant to 2005.  The more 
recent  decline  in  the  corporate  saving  rate  (Bayoumi  et  al.  2009)  may  have  shifted  this 
balance toward the appreciating effect of the mark-ups. 
Slowing-down of trade reform: China’s 2001 WTO accession saw a wide range of tariff cuts 
and market-opening policy changes.  Since then trade reform has slowed.
23  As discussed 
previously, trade liberalisations depreciate the real exchange rate and so this slow-down might 
be  seen  as  at  least  relaxing  depreciating  pressure.    Yet  trade  reforms  are  never  Pareto 
improving  without  compensation.    The  sector  bearing  the  most  negative  effects  from  the 
WTO accession has been agriculture, the stagnation of which in the early years after the WTO 
accession probably contributed to the substantial rural-urban migration of the period (Chang 
and Tyers 2008; Rees and Tyers 2008).  Since then a major concern of the central government 
                                                 
22 See Chamon and Prasad (2008), Wen (2008). 
23 According to the WTO’s Trade Policy Review (2008), the tariff is still one of China’s main trade policy 
instruments.  The overall average applied MFN tariff was 9.7% in 2007, the same as in 2005.  The average 
applied MFN tariff rates for agricultural and non-agricultural products were 15.3% and 8.8%, respectively, also 
the same as in 2005.   13 
has  been  the  welfare  of  farmers  and  other  rural  dwellers.    Unlike  the  corresponding 
experiences of Japan, Korea and Taiwan during their growth surges, because of the WTO 
commitment, China has not been able to address the rural-urban divide using trade protection 
(Anderson et al., 1986; Anderson, 2009; Duncan et al., 2008).  A consequence has been a 
trend  from  negative  assistance  to  agriculture  in  the  early  reform  period  to  positive  and 
significant protection today, channelled via domestic marketing, transport, storage and other 
budgetary  assistance,  allowed  under  WTO  rules  for  developing  countries.
24  Beyond 
agriculture, a number of trade-biased policies have emerged that cut against the spirit of the 
pre-accession reforms.  Since 2005, the value-added tax (VAT) rebate for exporting firms has 
been re-raised nine times up to 17%, covering approximately 3800 export products, including 
textile, clothing, toys, machinery, electric appliances, medicines, communication devices and 
steel.
 25 Such export encouraging policies divert home supplies abroad, raising the relative 
prices of domestic goods and hence appreciating the real exchange rate. 
Rising relative wage costs: The sectoral price indices of Figure 1 are revealing in that, since 
the  mid-2000s  they  do  not  show  any  rise  in  the  prices  of  services  (the  “tertiary”  and 
construction sectors) relative to the tradable goods sectors.  This suggests that the appreciation 
since  2004  is  not  due  to  the  BSH  force  (relatively  high  productivity  growth  in  China’s 
tradable sectors).   Indeed, the striking change is in the price index for primary products, 
indicating a substantial improvement in the agricultural terms of trade.  While this is due in 
part to higher prices of import competing commodities, we have already seen that there have 
been a number of favourable changes to policies affecting agriculture and the rural sector 
generally.    These  changes  would  have  raised  the  marginal  product  of  rural  labour  and 
therefore the incentive required for rural workers to migrate to Eastern cities. 
A simple analysis suggests a structural change in real wage growth for the agricultural 
and construction sectors around 2004, as indicated for agricultural wages in Figure 6.  The 
labour forces in these sectors are mainly unskilled and the rural labour market is the source of 
most  non-hukou  workers  in  construction,  other  services  and  manufacturing.    The  official 
                                                 
24 Huang et al. (2009) show the trend in assistance to agriculture clearly in Table 3.5.  Still more recently, the 
speech byWen (2010) indicates the central government plans to raise the agricultural subsidy to 133 billion Yuan 
in 2010.  The same speech indicates that agricultural tax reductions were carried out in Anhui province in 2000 
and  were then extended to 30 provinces in 2003.  By 2005, agricultural production taxes  were completely 
cancelled in 28 provinces.  Farmers’ benefits were estimated at 133.5 billion Yuan per year. 
25 See Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2009).   14 
agricultural real wage grew at 3.1 per cent per year (with standard error 0.0012) in the period 
1994-2004 and at 4.7 per cent per year (with standard error 0.002) in the period 2005-2008.
26 
In their study of the real wages of unskilled factory workers in Guangdong, Meng and 
Bai (2007) used payroll data to ensure the inclusion of non-hukou workers.  They show a 
much  smaller  annual  growth  rate  of  between  0.5  and  1.5  per  cent  per  year  up  to  2004, 
controlling for education and firm tenure.  The take-off in rural wages after that time suggests, 
however, that real non-hukou rates have increased since, and this is to be expected from the 
improvements in net returns from agricultural activity.  Increasingly, it is likely that potential 
“floating workers” are choosing to continue their rural employment.  Anecdotal indications of 
tightening labour markets have been abundant, including increased labour unrest suggesting 
improved  labour  market  power  in  manufacturing  provinces.
27   What  is  in  evidence  is  a 
slowing of urban labour supply growth, which drives up the cost of both tradable and non-
tradable goods relative to China’s trading partners, and hence causes the real exchange rate to 
appreciate.  While this seems to be associated with agricultural incentives in the short term, 
along with improvements in infrastructure that have boosted local services sectors, in the long 
term the prospect can only be for a continuation.  This is because demographic change already 
long in train will see China’s total labour force begin to decline during the next decade (Cai 
and Wang 2006, Golley and Tyers 2006).  In short, this change may be heralding the end of 
the era of the Dooley et al. (2003) “revived Bretton Woods trade account” regions generating 
export  growth  on  the  back  of  surplus  rural  labour,  at  least  so  far  as  China  is  concerned 
(Feenstra and Hong 2007). 
 
4. Macroeconomic Policy and the Renminbi 
The  real  and  nominal  exchange  rates  are  linked  by  definition  (Equatiion  1)  as 
( )
* * / / R Y Y Y Y e P EP E P P = = × , where E is the nominal exchange rate (in foreign currency per 
unit of home currency), PY is the price of the home product bundle (the GDP price) and P
*
Y is  
the corresponding foreign GDP price.  Since the foreign price level is outside the realm of 
home monetary policy, changes in the real exchange rate (determined as discussed in the 
previous  sections)  are  transmitted  domestically  through  changes  in  either  the  nominal 
exchange rate or the home price level.  The choice as to how these are combined is a matter 
                                                 
26 The growth rates were obtained from a simple OLS regression of the log of the nominal  agricultural wage 
deflated by the CPI against time.  The standard errors on the growth rate coefficients in both regressions are very 
small, suggesting the growth rates are significantly different. 
27 Strikes at key joint venture plants and other activism led to substantial increases in manufacturing wages in 
2009 in engine room provinces of Guangdong and Zhejiang (Gardner 2010).   15 
for home monetary authorities.  By adjusting the supply of home money via the short interest 
rate or bank reserve requirements, a real appreciation can be transmitted at one extreme as a 
nominal  appreciation  (inflation  targeting)  or,  at  another,  as  an  inflation  (exchange  rate 
targeting).  This is complicated, particularly in China’s case, by the dependence of the real 
exchange rate on capital account flows, which are dominated by reserve accumulation, where 
the choice of reserves is also an instrument of monetary policy. 
 
Reserve accumulation and monetary mercantilism 
China’s  reserve  accumulation  has  led  to  allegations  of  ‘monetary  mercantilism’ 
(Aizenman and Lee, 2006).  It is implied that reserve accumulation is chosen freely in order to 
keep the real exchange rate low.  In our view the monetary mercantilist critique is misplaced.  
The  root  of  its  unfairness  is  evident  from  the  identity  derived  previously, 
NF D KA S R I S = -D = -  and, therefore D NF R S I S D = - + , where  NF S  includes approved FDI 
and illegal private inflows.  As long as total domestic savings exceed investment and capital 
controls  prevent  the  matching  of  inward  FDI  by  private  outflows,   R  must  be  positive.  
Indeed, under certain conditions we can state that China’s current account surplus must be 
matched by reserve accumulation and the imbalance is not amenable to feasible changes in 
macroeconomic policy, narrowly defined.  Those conditions are: 
1)  the capital controls are justified on stability grounds, 
2)   the high private saving rate is impervious to macroeconomic policy in the short run, 
3)  government revenue is increasing so quickly that the government cannot easily offset 
private saving with public dis-saving, and 
4)  investment is already beyond absorptive capacity at 45 per cent of GDP. 
Consider each of these in turn. 
Capital controls: The capital controls are conceptually simplest.  They stem from “fear of 
floating” and short memories of the currency run with which China was threatened in the late 
1990s during the Asian financial crisis.  Moreover, some PBC suspicions remain as to the 
prudential reliability of China’s commercial banks in exchanging large volumes of foreign 
currency.    Financial  institutions  are  variously  perceived  as  not  sufficiently  distant  from 
decades of soft budget constraints associated with the channelling of government subsidies to 
state-owned  enterprises  through  accumulated  debt.    And  there  are  concerns  that  the 
commercial banks lack access to or sufficient experience with derivative markets for currency   16 
and debt instruments to do the necessary hedging.  Though their continued effectiveness is 
vouched for by Ma and McCauley (2007), the controls are slowly being relaxed. 
The  high  saving  rate:  As  indicated  earlier,  China’s  high  private  saving  rate  is  due  to 
comparatively high household saving and extraordinarily high corporate saving.  While the 
former has ceased to rise and is expected to decline slowly with time as health and retirement 
insurance systems develop (Chamon and Prasad 2008), the latter, as argued by Tyers and Lu 
(2009) is due to the profitability of key state owned enterprises and is therefore an issue for 
industrial policy, which will take time to resolve.  The causes of high saving are therefore 
deeply structural and the subject of long term programs of microeconomic policy reform.  
None is amenable to action by the central bank alone. 
The level of investment: As noted by Xiao (2006), it has been suggested that the surplus of 
saving over investment implies that the rate of investment is too low.  At 45 per cent of its 
GDP, however, China’s investment is extraordinarily high.  It is difficult to imagine how 
additional projects might be conceived and implemented given service sector planning and 
facilitation  constraints.    Moreover,  China’s  low  official  domestic  financing  rates 
notwithstanding,  recent  surveys  by  the  PBC  show  that  a  very  substantial  proportion  of 
investment  still  takes  place  through  the  informal  sector  at  rates  that  remain  high  by 
international standards.  It will take some time yet for financial intermediation costs in China 
to fall to developed country levels and so financing costs must continue to be a break on 
investment.
28 
Government dis-saving: Prior to the global financial crisis, China’s fiscal policy maintained a 
tight balance between revenue and expenditure.  During the crisis the government committed 
to  a  substantial  fiscal  expansion,  including  an  ambitious  program  of  infrastructural 
investments, with a view to reducing the national saving rate and raising private consumption 
expenditure.  This prospect faces two difficulties.  First, public infrastructure investment to 
that point already absorbed a larger share of GDP in China than in any other developing 
country  of  comparable  income  per  capita  (Roland-Holst  et  al.  2005).    Second,  revenue 
collections  have  grown  faster  than  China’s  GDP  as  its  tax  system  has  improved  in 
effectiveness and as more of China’s economic activity has occurred in the relatively taxable 
                                                 
28 The effect of high financial intermediation costs on China’s growth rate is modelled by Tyers and Golley 
(2010).   17 
“modern” sectors.  It is yet unclear whether the accelerated spending has outpaced revenue 
collections.  Certainly there has yet been no dramatic rise in government bond issues.
29 
This support of the “four conditions” suggests that the Chinese government has little 
true  discretion  over  its  rate  of  reserve  accumulation  and  therefore  over  the  rate  at  which 
domestic  income  is  diverted  into  expenditure  abroad,  weighing  on  its  underlying  real 
exchange  rate.    The  extent  to  which  the  national  saving  rate  has  stabilised  very  recently 
suggests, however, that reserve accumulation may be a more neutral force in future. 
 
Liquidity and sterilisation 
Through 2008 at least, the PBC absorbed foreign currency inflows (export revenue) 
net of import costs because, short of long term reforms affecting financial depth and while the 
capital controls remained, the Chinese commercial banks could not move the required volume 
of foreign currency.  This required acquisition of this foreign currency surplus with newly 
minted  domestic  currency.    To  avoid  excess  liquidity,  annual  reserve  increments  were 
sterilised.  PBC holdings of domestic credit were insufficient for this sterilisation, however, so 
‘sterilisation bonds’ were issued on the debit side of the balance sheet shown in Table 3. 
Just  as  the  reserves  have  come  to  dominate  the  asset  side  of  the  balance  sheet, 
sterilisation bonds assumed significance on the debit side.  In effect, the PBC has acted as a 
conduit for domestic savers who might otherwise acquire foreign assets but are restricted 
from doing so by capital controls.  The pressure from abroad to revalue therefore creates two 
difficulties for the PBC.  First, since the assets of the PBC are primarily in US dollars and its 
liabilities  are  in  renminbi,  too  prompt  an  appreciation  of  the  renminbi  would  result  in 
substantial losses that would need to be covered in renminbi from the government budget.  
This concern was addressed in 2007 with the issue of US$ 200 billion in government debt to 
be  exchanged  with  the  PBC  for  reserve  assets,  the  latter  to  be  maintained  by  China’s 
“sovereign wealth fund”, the state-run China Investment Company (CIC).
30 
As shown in Figure 7, this sterilisation process kept a lid on the monetary base as a 
proportion of GDP until the mid-2000s.  Liquidity growth was substantial thereafter.  It is our 
                                                 
29 According to the Ministry of Finance, during 2006-2009, the Chinese government issued bonds worth 888, 
798, 862 and 778 billion Yuan, respectively, showing no increasing trend.  Besides this, 1550 billion Yuan in 
special bonds were issued in 2007, and exchanged with the PBC for the equivalent from its stock of reserves.  
The result was a substitution on the asset side of about 8% of GDP from reserves to domestic credit. 
 
30 The CIC takes the formerly-established “foreign exchange financial investment company” (the Hui Jin Co: 
literally translated as foreign exchange and gold) as its subsidiary.  Hui Jin mainly does equity investment in 
domestic financial industries while its parent company CIC focuses on overseas investment.  Thanks are due to 
the PBC for this detail.   18 
view that this has stemmed from the on-going financial reforms, which have greatly expanded 
commercial bank intermediation (in place of pre-existing and relatively costly informal credit 
structures and credit cooperatives).  This has been valuable but the associated expansion in 
deposits  has  also  boosted  overall  money  supply  growth,  contributing  since  2006  to 
inflationary pressure.  The PBC responded with higher bank reserve requirements and higher 
short interest rates.  The latter added to speculative (illegal) private inflows driven by the 
expectation that the RMB would be allowed to appreciate further, bringing upward pressure 
on the real exchange rate in the lead-up to the global financial crisis and since.  As Figures 2 
and 3 show, however, during the crisis the drop in export demand caused a temporary real 
depreciation.  The return to the de facto peg then necessitated contractionary monetary policy 
and a temporary deflation. 
 
The effect of relaxing capital controls 
As capital controls are relaxed, a key issue will be the extent of private outflows on 
the  financial  account.    Prasad  et  al.  (2005)  point  to  the  potential  for  this  to  create  a 
depreciating force as Chinese private investors seek to diversify their portfolios.  The scale of 
this force depends on whether the PBC’s existing foreign reserves are the equivalent of the 
private  sector’s  desired  foreign  holdings.    A  crude  assessment  of  this  can  be  made  by 
comparing  the  foreign  shares  of  collective  portfolios  across  developed  and  developing 
countries.  Assets are many and various and net positions are poorly documented, however.  
For a sample of countries we have constructed a crude approximation to foreign shares in 
collective  portfolios  using  estimates  of  capital  stocks  and  recorded  flows  on  balances  of 
payments.  The results require a sceptical eye, since capital stocks are measured differently 
across countries and foreign shares can be expected to be higher in smaller and more open 
economies  irrespective  of  their  levels  of  development,  as  in  the  cases  of  Hong  Kong, 
Singapore and the UK. 
The resulting foreign asset shares are listed in Table 4.  The countries are then ranked 
on their estimated  foreign shares in  Table 5.   Most striking is that, large official foreign 
reserves notwithstanding, China ranks rather low on the list, even when compared with other 
Asian developing countries.  Its foreign share appears to have doubled between 2000 and 
2005 and its ranking rose.  By 2005 it ranked above Japan, Korea, Thailand, India and Brazil 
but below the other developed countries and Malaysia, Taiwan and Chile.  Its ranking above 
Japan and the other two of the world’s very large developing countries, India and Brazil, 
suggests its foreign share may be on the high side, though none of these economies is as open   19 
as China already is to foreign trade and ownership (Lardy 2006).  On the other hand, its 
ranking  below  the  developed  countries  suggests  that  continued  growth,  combined  with 
comparative openness, will take its share higher.  At the very least, these results do not lend 
clear weight to the thesis that financial liberalisation will automatically raise private inflows 
and appreciate the RMB.  Moreover, a surge in private rebalancing outflows could prove a 
healthy  outcome  since  the  PBC  could  readily  offset  this  by  repatriating  its  reserves  and 
sterilising the inflow by liquidating its “sterilisation bonds”.  This would take the pressure off 
the CIC by restoring the PBC’s balance sheet to something more conventional as well as 
stabilise the home financial capital market. 
 
5. Unilateral appreciation scenarios 
If the tendency toward real appreciation since 2004 is indeed due to labour market 
tightening, it heralds a log term appreciating trend.  This will make it easy for the PBC to 
allow a corresponding appreciation in the RMB.  Any decision to revalue faster than the 
underlying rate of real appreciation would require further monetary tightening and possibly a 
return to the growth-sapping deflation of the late 1990s. 
McKinnon’s  (2004)  sage  preference  for  an  East  Asian  dollar  standard 
notwithstanding,  the  bilateral  pressure  by  the  US  government  for  an  RMB  revaluation  is 
understandable  in  one  respect.    Ignoring  the  benefits  accruing  to  the  US  economy  from 
Chinese  investment,  it  perceives  a  substantial  current  account  imbalance,  a  proportion  of 
which stems from its bilateral trade with China, and it expects that a US$ depreciation will 
help to correct it (Woo 2006).  Not only does the inflexibility of the RMB rate frustrate the 
US government, inciting the critical rhetoric  (Bernanke 2006)  and the draft legislation to 
“punish” China (Callan 2007), but it also causes frustration in Europe, where the burden of 
appreciation against the US$ is greatest.
31 
Ironically,  while  the  refusal  by  some  other  Asian  countries  to  appreciate  their 
currencies  significantly  against  the  RMB  might  well  be  motivated  by  “monetary 
mercantilism”, we believe that the sluggishness of China’s appreciation against the US$ is 
motivated  internally.    The  sticking  point  is  a  fear  of  financial  (including  exchange  rate) 
volatility, confirmed by adherence to the US dollar peg during the GFC.  Were the Chinese 
government  nonetheless  to  agree  to  revalue  faster  than  the  underlying  rate  of  real 
appreciation,  it  could  either  undertake  a  substantial  monetary  tightening,  and  hence 
                                                 
31 See RGE Monitor, 2007a. European rhetoric also represents this view, as in a speech by Pascal Lamy, then EU 
Trade Commissioner, on 23 December 2003.   20 
experience a further deflation, or it could accelerate the underlying real appreciation with a 
return to distorted trade. 
 
Appreciation by monetary contraction 
In the absence of any substantial upward movement in the underlying real exchange 
rate, the PBC could simply declare a higher US$/RMB rate.  This is the option advocated by 
Tung and Baker (2004), who suggested a 15% one-off revaluation and argue that the risk of 
consequent  deflation  is  minimal,  due  to  inflationary  pressure  from  other  sources.    In  the 
absence  of  an  underlying  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  this  argument  lacks 
foundation.
32 
The defence of the stronger RMB would require a contraction of the domestic money 
supply (or a slowdown in its growth) and a boost to domestic short term interest rates and 
other financing barriers.  If the revaluation were large enough the result would likely be a 
return to the deflation of the late 1990s and this would hurt employment in the tradable goods 
sectors.  Income would decline (or grow more slowly), as would consumption and saving.  
Slower employment growth in the modern sector would reduce capital returns and, combined 
with higher financing costs, this would also contract investment (or reduce its growth), and so 
the implications for China’s external imbalance would then depend on the relative size of the 
saving contraction.  For external balance there are, therefore, two cases to consider. 
Optimistic households: If Chinese households are optimistic they expect that the contraction 
is temporary and unrestrained  growth will be restored in the future.  Faced with reduced 
current income they would then smooth consumption by reducing current saving.  Even with 
such a reduction in the saving rate, however, our simulation shows that the effect of lower 
employment growth on capital returns causes a bigger proportional fall in investment than in 
saving.  Total domestic saving is initially larger than investment, so the reduction in saving 
still outweighs that in investment and the net effect is to  reduce China’s current account 
surplus.  This result is indicated in the first column of Table 6.  There is a real appreciation 
against  North  America  and  a  slight  reduction  in  the  latter’s  current  account  deficit.    In 
addition,  there  is  a  slight  addition  to  North  America’s  politically  sensitive  industrial 
employment, though this comes at the expense of a service sector employment contraction 
due to North America’s real depreciation against China.  Both China and North America 
                                                 
32 This is broadly consistent with the view expressed by Huang (2010).   21 
suffer losses in overall GDP and real income per capita.  The loss in China is substantial, 
however, amounting to almost a year’s growth.
33 
Pessimistic households: A second possibility is that Chinese households are pessimistic and 
believe  that  the  contraction  is  permanent.    In  response  to  the  monetary  contraction  and 
reduced income they would then exhibit behaviour seen in Japan in the 1990s, smoothing 
their consumption forward and raising their saving rate.
34  As shown in the second column of 
Table  6,  this  exacerbates  the  contraction  in  Chinese  economic  activity  and  income.  
Moreover, because saving does not fall and investment does, China’s current account surplus 
is raised.   The additional financial outflow  causes a  real depreciation,  suggesting that, to 
achieve a particular nominal appreciation target, the monetary contraction in this case would 
need to deliver a larger deflation than before (Equation 1).  Internationally, this shock reduces 
global interest rates and raises North America’s current account deficit.  Even though there 
are small gains in North America’s terms of trade and real income, the exacerbation of current 
account  imbalances  and  the  associated  decline  in  industrial  employment  would  further 
frustrate the US politically.  It is difficult to conclude other than that there is little to be gained 
from RMB appreciation by monetary contraction. 
 
Taxing trade 
The other “unhealthy” approach to a unilateral appreciation is via trade distortions.  
We can dismiss a rise in import tariffs as fanciful, since China’s WTO accession conditions 
offer very little room between applied and bound tariff rates.  In any case, the returns from the 
resulting openness have been so considerable that trade policy reversals are unlikely to rise 
much above the radar.  Export restraints are possible, however, of the type followed by Japan 
in the late 1980s, when it was under similar pressure from the US.  Since these are not directly 
protectionist and hence would not attract mercantilist objections from abroad.  In principle at 
least, like import tariffs, they might be expected to divert domestic demand from foreign to 
home products and thereby appreciate the real exchange rate, allowing the central bank to also 
appreciate the nominal exchange rate.  The downside is that they would also be a tax on the 
most rapidly expanding sectors in the economy and so they would sacrifice growth in urban 
employment and income. 
                                                 
33 The simulations described here are indicative only, since the model lacks a closure with forward looking 
expectations.  Here we try to capture the range of possible impacts by simulating optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios. 
34 Ito (2001: Ch 11, 329-333) shows that, in the post Plaza Accord period the Yen appreciated substantially 
against the US$ and Japan’s current account surplus rose at the same time, even while real investment also rose.   22 
Our simulation is of the short run impacts of an export tax of 15% graduated over 
2007-2009 and levied only on industrial exports.  As previously, we consider scenarios with 
both optimistic and pessimistic households.  Surprisingly, as shown in the final two columns 
of Table 6, in both cases China experiences robust real depreciations against North America.  
This is because China’s current account surplus rises even in the optimistic case in which the 
saving rate falls temporarily.  This contradicts the expected story because that emphasises 
substitution in final demand.  The true story is about intermediate demand.  China’s export 
manufacturing sector relies to an extraordinary extent on imported components, mostly from 
Asian trading partners.
35  When the export tax contracts this sector, imports are similarly 
contracted.  Total exports, in fact, contract by a smaller proportion because there is offsetting 
expansion in agricultural and service exports that are not intensive in imported inputs.  The 
net effect is an expansion in China’s trade surplus. 
In North America the current account deficit rises and, as before, there are only small 
changes  in  real  GDP  and  real  per  capita  income.    Importantly,  however,  China’s  export 
restraints do raise North American industrial employment, again at the expense of services 
employment, even though North America experiences a real appreciation against China that 
would otherwise advantage the services sector.  In either case, at least in the short run, export 




Relative to the US, Chinese productivity has grown faster in the tradable than in the 
non-tradable sectors, real wages have also growth faster and there has been relative service 
price  inflation.    The  flat  trajectory  of  its  real  exchange  rate  between  1990  and  2004  is 
therefore  a  contradiction  of  the  BSH,  the  resolution  of  which  requires  generalisation  to 
incorporate failures of the law of one price for tradable goods, open financial capital markets 
and  a  more  sophisticated  representation  of  the  labour  market.    This  opens  the  way  for 
depreciating forces that have been offsetting the BSH, including net financial outflows on the 
balance  of  payments  associated  with  China’s  excess  saving  along  with  trade  and  other 
microeconomic reforms.  Decomposition of the flat trajectory of the real exchange rate over 
                                                 
35 An important empirical literature is developing around China’s role as an assembler of components made in 
other Asian countries.  Part of the reason for China’s bilateral trade surplus with the US is that this intra-Asian 
trade is reducing the bilateral surpluses of other Asian economies with the US while it exacerbates that of China.  
See, for example, Athukorala (2005, 2007).   23 
1997-2004  reveals  that  the  BSH  is  most  strongly  offset  by  the  excess  saving  and  the 
associated expansion of net outflows on its capital account, along with a significant additional 
contribution  from  WTO  accession  trade  reforms.    China’s  real  exchange  rate  began 
appreciating  in  the  mid-2000s  when  the  national  saving  rate  stabilised  and  trade  reforms 
petered out.  An examination of the trends in relative product prices and real wages in this 
period suggests that the real appreciation is not due to a resumption of a dominant BSH.  
Instead it appears to be due to tightening rural labour markets associated with improvements 
in the agricultural terms of trade, combined with slowing overall labour force growth. 
While much attention is paid in the literature to the “undervaluation” of the renminbi, 
it is in our view incorrect to blame this on China’s monetary policy, narrowly defined to 
include the exchange rate target and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.  The key 
constraints are  capital controls, motivated by concern about financial (and exchange rate) 
stability  in  the  face  of  the  relative  immaturity  of  its  commercial  banking  sector,  and 
structurally determined high savings.  While ever these remain, reserves will accumulate and 
exchange rate adjustment will not address the current account imbalance.  The only “healthy” 
way to appreciate the RMB will be to follow the path of the underlying real exchange rate.  
We show that defiance of this principle in the form of a unilateral appreciation by monetary 
contraction would be very costly to China, and it would most likely hurt the rest of the world 
by  tightening  capital  markets  and  changing  the  terms  of  trade  adversely.    Moreover,  if 
Chinese households were to react pessimistically to the shock, the current account surplus 
could be enlarged, backfiring on those who clamour for an appreciation to address global 
imbalances.  The other conceptually feasible, but no more healthy, approach to a unilateral 
appreciation is via the imposition by China of a tax on manufactured exports.  As it turns out, 
because China’s export manufacturing sector relies so heavily on imported components, such 
a  tax  would  actually  exacerbate  the  trade  surplus  by  cutting  imports  in  proportion  with 
manufactured  exports  while  expanding  other  less  import-dependent  exports.    This  would 
increase China’s current account surplus while sacrificing considerable growth.  It would hurt 
the North American economy overall. 
In the near term, with an appreciating trend in the underlying real exchange rate, it is 
reasonable for the central bank to allow a unilateral nominal appreciation of the RMB to ease 
domestic inflation pressure.  To the extent that this appreciating trend is not fast enough for 
political equilibria in China’s trading partners, international pressure would best be focussed 
on key reforms, including smooth transitions to policies that better regulate large state owned 
enterprises and address the need for uniform systems of retirement and health insurance, all of   24 
which will reduce the extraordinary saving rate.  In the long term, whether there is a sustained 
upward  trend  in  China’s  real  exchange  rate  will  depend  on  the  relative  strengths  of 
appreciating forces, including tradable productivity growth, reduced savings and labour force 
decline, and depreciating forces that include productivity growth in its services sector. 
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a These are sectoral price indices for ‘Primary industry’, which is agriculture and rural services; ‘industry’, which 
is primarily manufacturing, and ‘construction’ (the latter two making up the “secondary” sector); and ‘tertiary 
industry’, which is other services. 
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a.  These are indices of nominal bilateral rates between mainland China and the US, deflated according to 
/
US
R Y Y e E P P = × , where E is the nominal exchange rate in US$ per unit of local currency,  Y P  is the local GDP 
price and 
US
Y P  is the corresponding US GDP price. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (2009). 
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a.  Here the home prices are, for the US, the Producer Price Index and, for China, the Corporate Goods Price 
Index.    The  Chinese  index  has  more  coverage  of  commodities  and  services,  so  this  is  a  less  than  perfect 
comparison.  The implied real exchange rate is in black. 
Sources:  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics  (2009),  National  Bureau  of  Statistics  of  China  (2009),  the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, USA. 
 
 




















a The penetration rate is the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each percentage increase 
in the overall import penetration ratio, M/C, caused by tariff reductions that began in 2005. 
Source: Simulations using the model described in the text.   30 

























a Since errors and omissions are large, we have adjusted the least accurately measured items in each sub-account 
(usually net factor income and net private flows on the financial account) to ensure balance. 
Sources:  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  2009a.  International  Financial  Statistics,  April,  International 
Monetary  Fund,  Washington,  DC.  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  2009b.  World  Economic  Outlook 
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a  The vertical axis is the log of the real wage index where the agricultural nominal wage is deflated by the CPI.  
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Source:  the People’s Bank of China. 
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Table 1: Estimated Chinese Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sector 
% per year  Whole 
economy 
Food  Industry  Services 
1986-1989  3.5  1.4  3.8  3.8 
1990-1994  5.0  1.6  7.7  2.3 
1995-1997  5.7  5.5  3.7  3.2 
1998-2001  4.1  -0.2  8.9  -0.5 
2002-2005  6.0  5.4  6.3  4.6 
Sources: Analysis of Chinese statistics described in Tyers et al. (2006).  Original sources are, for output, 
China Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and 
China  Statistical  Abstract  (2006).    Employment  data  are  from  China  Statistical  Year  Book  (2005),  China 
Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China Labor Statistical Year Book (every 
year after 1985).  China’s capital stock, in 2000 prices, is taken from Holtz (2006).  Sectoral price indices are 
from China Statistical Abstract (2006).  Urban employment is enlarged based on underestimation proportions 
from Cai and Wang (2006). 
 
 
Table 2: Contributions to China’s Real Exchange Rate Change, 1997-2006 
 
Faster tradable productivity growth – Balassa Samuelson  +1.6% 
Faster skill growth  -0.6% 
WTO accession trade reforms  -4.2% 
Influx on the financial/capital account of North America  -0.4% 
Efflux on the financial/capital account (high saving rate)  -4.8% 
Net effect over 1997-2006  -8.1% 
  Source:  Comparison  of  baseline  with  counterfactual  simulations  of  the  model 
described in the text. 
 
 
Table 3  The balance sheet of the People’s Bank of China, ca. 2009 
Assets  Liabilities 
Domestic credit, DC 
Central bank claims on depository and 
other financial corporations and on the 
central government 
13 per cent GDP 
The monetary base, MB 
Currency and bank reserves 
43 per cent GDP 
Sterilisation bonds, SB 
Debt to the Chinese public 
13 per cent GDP 
Official foreign reserves, R 
55 per cent GDP 
Other liabilities, OL 
Includes government ownership 
12 per cent GDP 
Source: People’s Bank of China, 2009. Balance Sheet of Monetary Authority. 
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Table 4  Estimates of the Foreign Share of Total Assets, Selected Countries
a 
Country  Ratio of Foreign to Total Assets, % 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
China  10  9  9  12  14  18 
Hong Kong  55  56  55  59  60  64 
Japan  9  12  12  14  14  17 
Taiwan  11  14  17  21  22  24 
Korea  11  13  13  15  17  16 
Malaysia  22  27  28  38  36  41 
Singapore  48  50  51  57  57  58 
Thailand  18  20  19  19  17  17 
India  6  9  9  11  12  11 
Brazil  5  6  8  8  7  5 
Mexico  7  8  7  8  9  9 
Chile  21  23  22  26  25  25 
Australia  15  17  17  18  19  21 
US  22  19  18  22  25  35 
EU15  30  33  30  34  36  47 
UK  63  63  52  54  54  68 
a Shares are approximated as the quotient of foreign financial and physical assets and total financial and physical 
assets.  The numerator is the stock of capital owned abroad plus official foreign reserves.  The denominator is 
official foreign reserves plus the home capital stock plus the stock of capital owned abroad less that part of the 
home  capital  stock  that  is  foreign  owned  plus  M2  plus  gold  stocks.    International  capital  ownership  is 
approximated, in turn, by dividing current account net factor income flows by long term bond rates. 
 
Sources: For most countries, foreign reserves, money supplies, gold stocks, net factor income flows on current 
account balances and long term bond rates are from the IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.  
For Taiwan these are from the Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2006.  For Chile the money supply is from the 
Central Bank of Chile; for Australia it is from the Reserve Bank of Australia and for Singapore it is from the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore.  For China and India, bond rates are from Datastream and, for the EU15, 
Malaysia and Chile the bond rates are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  All capital stock estimates are from 




Table 5  Country Rankings on Foreign Shares of Total Assets 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
UK  UK  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  UK 
Hong Kong  Hong Kong  UK  Singapore  Singapore  Hong Kong 
Singapore  Singapore  Singapore  UK  UK  Singapore 
EU15  EU15  EU15  Malaysia  Malaysia  EU15 
Malaysia  Malaysia  Malaysia  EU15  EU15  Malaysia 
US  Chile  Chile  Chile  US  US 
Chile  Thailand  Thailand  US  Chile  Chile 
Thailand  US  US  Taiwan  Taiwan  Taiwan 
Australia  Australia  Australia  Thailand  Australia  Australia 
Korea  Taiwan  Taiwan  Australia  Korea  China 
Taiwan  Korea  Korea  Korea  Thailand  Japan 
China  Japan  Japan  Japan  China  Thailand 
Japan  China  India  China  Japan  Korea 
Mexico  India  China  India  India  India 
India  Mexico  Brazil  Brazil  Mexico  Mexico 
Brazil  Brazil  Mexico  Mexico  Brazil  Brazil 
Source: Rankings on the foreign asset shares in Table 4. 
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Table 6  Short Term Real Effects of a Chinese Monetary Contraction and 
an Export Tax
a 
% departures from baseline  Monetary contraction
b  Export tax
c 
  Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic 
China         
          Investment  -13.3  -17.8  -17.2  -25.4 
          Saving  -10.1  0.0  -12.1  0.0 
          Consumption  0.0  -14.2  0.0  -15.5 
          Current account surplus  -8.4  48.0  2.5  62.8 
          Terms of trade  1.1  -0.7  3.8  0.5 
          Real GDP  -7.5  -8.0  -5.0  -3.5 
          Real GNP/capita  -7.3  -5.8  -2.4  1.1 
          Real exchange rate, eR  1.8  -1.3  -4.8  -9.3 
North America         
          Current account deficit  -2.1  7.3  0.1  9.9 
          Terms of trade  -0.15  0.1  -0.6  -0.2 
          Real GDP  -0.04  0.13  -0.10  0.12 
          Real GNP/capita  -0.04  0.05  -0.14  -0.02 
          Employment in “industry”  0.14  -0.19  1.04  0.71 
                                   “services”  -0.04  0.09  -0.20  -0.07 
a  The shocks are implemented over the period 2007-2010 and the 2010 departures from the baseline simulation 
are  shown.    Both  shocks  are  implemented  under  two  different  assumptions  about  household  inter-temporal 
decision making.  The optimistic case has backward smoothing with a short run saving contraction while the 
pessimistic case has forward smoothing with a short run contraction in consumption.  In both cases investment is 
driven by the same adaptive expectations over capital returns, except that, in the optimistic cases, the annual rate 
of decline in China’s investment premium,  which diminishes through time in the baseline scenario, is held 
constant for the three years of the shocks to reflect greater optimism on the part of financial investors. 
b    The  monetary  contraction  is  assumed  not  to  be  unaccompanied  by  reserve  repatriation,  so  that  it  is 
deflationary.  It is sufficient to reduce employment by a cumulative 5% per year for three years 2007-2010. 
c  The Chinese export tax is applied only to industrial products and it accumulates linearly to a total of 15% over 
2007-2010.  No associated employment contraction is included with the export tax. 
Source: Simulations using the model described in the text. 
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